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Abstract—Vehicles have become complex computer systems
with multiple communication interfaces. In the future, vehicles
will have even more connections to e.g., infrastructure, pedestrian
smartphones, cloud, road-side-units and the Internet. External
and physical interfaces, as well as internal communication buses
have shown to have potential to be exploited for attack purposes.
As a consequence, there is an increase in regulations which
demand compliance with vehicle cyber resilience requirements.
However, there is currently no clear guidance on how to comply
with these regulations from a technical perspective.
To address this issue, we have performed a comprehensive threat
and risk analysis based on published attacks against vehicles from
the past 10 years, from which we further derive necessary security
and resilience techniques. The work is done using the SPMT
methodology where we identify vital vehicle assets, threat actors,
their motivations and objectives, and develop a comprehensive
threat model. Moreover, we develop a comprehensive attack model
by analyzing the identified threats and attacks. These attacks
are filtered and categorized based on attack type, probability,
and consequence criteria. Additionally, we perform an exhaustive
mapping between asset, attack, threat actor, threat category, and
required mitigation mechanism for each attack, resulting in a
presentation of a secure and resilient vehicle design. Ultimately,
we present the Resilient Shield a novel and imperative framework
to justify and ensure security and resilience within the automotive
domain.
Index Terms—cyber resilience, security, vehicular systems,
automotive systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The complexity of vehicles is increasing. Consequently,
vulnerabilities which might be exploited increase as well.
Attacks to vehicular systems can be realized: (i) indirectly via
compromised devices e.g., phones, dongles, or workshop com-
puters connected to vehicle interfaces; (ii) directly via physical
interfaces e.g., debug ports and the OBD-II connector; and (iii)
remotely via various malicious sources, such as rogue access
points and compromised servers. It has been demonstrated
that vehicle cyber attacks e.g., physical attacks [1] and remote
attacks [2] are potential threats that have to be taken seriously.
As a case in point, Miller and Valasek [3] performed a success-
ful remote attack on a Jeep Cherokee via the Internet taking
control of its primary functions by exploiting an open port via
a cellular channel, an attack that led to a recall of 1.4 million
vehicles. In [4], researchers managed to get remote access to
the CAN bus of a BMW by compromising its infotainment
system, allowing them to execute arbitrary diagnostic requests.
Vulnerabilities in phone applications paired to vehicles have
been exploited by adversaries to track vehicles, unlock the
doors and to start their ignitions [5]–[7].
Motivation. Securing a vehicle as an afterthought is cumber-
some, considering both the complexity which constantly in-
creases and the existing dependencies on current architectural
design. Hence, it is imperative to consider security during the
vehicle’s complete life cycle from idea to cessation.
There are increased requirements towards ensuring a resilient
vehicle design, in a way that a vehicle should be able to
withstand various types of cyber attacks, malfunctioning units,
and other external disturbances. Consequently, the resilient
design should be able to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber
attacks, something which is also in line with the UNECE
regulation [8] and the upcoming standard for automotive cyber
security ISO 21434 [9]. In short, prevention is accomplished
with security controls, detection by identifying faults and
attacks, and response are mechanisms related to handling the
detected anomalies with the ability to restore and maintain
operation. However, there is currently no clear guidance how
to comply with the aforementioned regulations and standards
from a technical perspective. The start, predict, mitigate, and
test (SPMT) is a systematic approach for identification and
mitigation of vulnerabilities in vehicles [10]. The aim of SPMT
is to ultimately enhance the security of vehicles through their
entire life cycle. In this paper, we use and extend the SPMT
methodology to establish an in-depth resilient design model
with imperative mitigation mechanisms.
Contributions. By applying the SPMT methodology, we per-
formed a comprehensive threat and risk analysis of 52 pub-
lished attacks against vehicles from the past 10 years. 37 of
these attacks were considered significant due to their high risk
and were thus further mitigated with imperative security and
resilience techniques. In this process, we have developed a
threat model for securing vehicles by identifying vital vehicle
assets and the related potential threat actors, their motivations
and objectives. Moreover, we have developed a comprehensive
attack model created from the analysis of the identified threats
and attacks, further filtered and categorized based on attack
type and risk criteria related to the probability and conse-
quences of the attack. We present a comprehensive summery of
the result from applying the SPMT methodology, an exhaustive
mapping between asset, attack, threat actor, threat category and
resilience mechanism for each attack. Ultimately, we define
necessary security and resilience enhancements for vehicles,
the Resilient Shield, which also validates the effectiveness of
the methodology. To the best of our knowledge, our result is
both novel and imperative to justify and ensure security and
resilience within the automotive domain.
978-1-7281-8964-2/21/$31.00 ©2021 IEEE
II. RELATED WORK
Good practices for security of smart cars [11], Cyber
security and Resilience of smart cars [12], and The Cyber
security guidebook for cyber physical vehicle systems, SAE
J3061 [13], provide guidelines regarding threat and risk assess-
ment. EVITA [14] proposed a method for security, safety, and
risk analysis of in-vehicle networks, whereas HEAVENS [15]
proposed a security model based on security objectives from
EVITA and security attributes from Microsoft STRIDE [16].
Rosenstatter et al. [17] continue with the result from an
analysis such as HEAVENS and map the identified security
demands to security mechanisms. However, this mapping
focuses only on securing the in-vehicle network.
The SPMT methodology builds on existing methods, models
and security principles that are applicable to different phases in
a vehicle’s life cycle. By adapting and incorporating relevant
parts suitable for the vehicular domain, a comprehensive
security and safety enhancement is achieved. Consequently,
the SPMT methodology covers the vehicles entire life cycle,
something which cannot be achieved with existing method-
ologies [10]. SPMT adopts Microsoft’s STRIDE categoriza-
tion [16] which enables a mapping of attacks to a category with
associated security attributes. Thus, mitigation mechanisms
can be considered for the attribute and consequently mitigate
more than one attack. Additionally in SPMT, a reduction
analysis is performed for critical threats by creating attack
trees to connect the vulnerability with the threat, i.e., an
attacker wanders from a leaf node (condition) to the root of the
tree (attacker objective). Consequently, the closer to the root a
countermeasure is placed, the more conditions are mitigated.
Moreover, some conditions can be attained by more than one
attack, hence a countermeasure can mitigate several attacks.
The REMIND framework [18] for vehicular systems provides
a taxonomy for resilience techniques identified from a review
of existing work. In this paper we take advantage of previous
knowledge and new results by applying the SPMT method-
ology. In the next sections we present the detailed approach
followed by the results.
III. APPROACH
We use the aforementioned SPMT model to perform a com-
prehensive threat modelling and risk assessment of published
attacks to further map these threats and attacks to imperative
security and resilience mechanisms.
The SPMT methodology has 4 phases: Start, Predict, Miti-
gate and Test. In this paper, we perform the first three phases
on a Target Of Evaluation (ToE) and analyze security threats
and attacks as well as provide mechanisms for the mitigation
thereof (see Figure 1).
In the Start Phase, we address the following questions. What
are the threats requiring a resilient design? What are the entry
points to the vehicle? Who are the actors, their motivators, and
their objectives? The outcome of the Start Phase is a threat
model and high-level goals for the enforcement of security and
safety attributes.
In the Predict Phase, we address the following question.
What are the potential attacks? The outcome of the Predict
Phase is an attack model which contains relevant attacks
categorized and filtered according to a stated criteria.
In the Mitigate Phase, we address the following question.
What are the needed mechanisms to ensure a resilient design?
The outcome of the Mitigate Phase is a resilient design frame-
work i.e., the Resilient Shield, which provides mechanisms
and goals for detecting, preventing, and responding to security
threats and attacks.
The Test Phase includes the implementation of the mitiga-
tion mechanisms followed by an execution of different security
tests, such as fuzz, vulnerability, and penetration testing. In this
paper, we do not perform the Test Phase; however, we plan to
test the identified mitigation mechanisms within an industrial
context in the future.
In the following sections, we perform and provide the
outcomes of the first three phases of the SPMT methodology
(see Figure 1) that are used to establish the Resilient Shield.
IV. THREAT MODEL
A threat model is created by considering: (i) the target of
evaluation (ToE), and (ii) attackers as well as their motivators
and objectives. First, our ToE is stated as the complete vehicle
provided by the manufacturer, where we propose to include the
following assets. As shown in Table I, the relevance of these
assets is verified by the mapping to attacks.
Internal and external communication: Automotive Bus tech-
nologies, e.g., CAN, FlexRay, LIN, MOST and Ethernet.
Connection interfaces, e.g., OBD-II, USB, debug ports, Wi-Fi
and Bluetooth.
Hardware: ECUs, e.g., sensor signal processing. Sensors,
related to speed, position, temperature, airbag and object
detection. Actuators, translate signals from ECUs into actions,
e.g., braking, steering and engine control.
Software in transit, rest or running: Software update systems,
e.g., over-the-air or workshop updates. Software installed or
running in ECUs.
Data Storage: Sensitive data, e.g., cryptographic keys, foren-
sics logs and reports.
Second, we propose a simplification of threat actors (i.e.,
attackers) inspired by the work of Karahasanovic et al. [19]
in relation to motivators and objectives.
Actors and Motivators. The Financial Actor is driven by
financial gain in relation to a company (intellectual property),
organization or individual. This actor can be the owner who
Fig. 1. The first three phases of the SPMT methodology
wants to make unauthorised modifications (e.g., chip tuning)
or criminals who install ransomware. The Foreign Country
is driven by power through cyber warfare, with the intent to
disable viable assets within infrastructure (e.g., transportation).
The Cyber Terrorist is driven by ideological, political or
religious objectives. The Insider is motivated by retaliation or
other personal gains, has knowledge of sensitive information
and may plant malicious code into the vehicle. The Hacktivist
is driven by publicity or adrenaline (i.e., the rush) and can have
an agenda for political or social change. The Script Kiddie has
usually no clear objective, possess limited knowledge and is
often using already available tools and scripts. However, the
reality is usually a combinations of the mentioned categories
and objectives, and actors can be black hat, gray hat, or
white hat hackers in relation to society’s interpretations of
the hackers’ intentions. White hat, are assumed to be the good
guys, black hats are the bad guys, and grey hat are somewhere
in the middle.
Furthermore, in Section VI we adopt the security and safety
attributes used in SPMT. These attributes are imperative to
uphold to ensure a secure and resilient vehicle. On the other
hand, the actors are driven by stated motivators (e.g., financial,
ideological, publicity) with the goal of compromising these
attributes. A discussion and a brainstorming about fulfilment
of these attributes is part of the Start Phase, however we have
chosen to include it in Section VI to have all considerations for
mitigation in one section. Stated assets and actors are applied
to Table I and used in the following section.
V. ATTACK MODEL
We perform a qualitative risk assessment of published
attacks covered in news media and research publications by
estimating (i) the probability and (ii) the consequences of the
attacks based on the following criteria. As shown in Table I,
the affected assets, the threat actors and the STRIDE categories
for each attack are considered during this assessment.
Attack Probability. The first step in this phase is to define
attack probability where the three following estimates should
be used:
E1: Where, when, and in what situation can the attack be
carried out?
E2: What expertise is required of the attacker?
E3: How much time does it take to perform the attack?
The resulting probability is on a scale of 1 to 3, where 3
indicates that an attack is more probable to take place. The
highest value in E1-E3 is chosen.
Fig. 2. Adapted table for the risk calculation from the SPMT methodology.
Attack Consequence. In the second step, the consequences
are defined by assessing the effect of the attack on the
operational, safety, privacy, and financial aspects. The resulting
consequence is on a scale from 1 to 3, where 3 indicates that
the consequence is more severe. The highest value is chosen.
Risk Assessment. Once we get the estimates of the attack
probability and consequences, we estimate the overall risk by
calculating the product of the probability and the consequence,
which gives a risk value between 1 and 9 (see Figure 2).
To achieve a realistic balance between the financial cost for
mitigation and its related complexity versus the risk and asset
value, we consider only the most significant threats. These
threats have a risk value of 6 or 9, which is in line with
ISO 26262 and ASIL [20] and corresponds to high and critical
risk.
A. Disclosed Attacks
To create the attack model, we follow the SPMT rec-
ommendation for search criteria and query scopus1 and
Google scholar for academic work, and common vulnerability
databases (NVD, CVE) with keywords related to vehicle,
attack and STRIDE categories (e.g., spoofing) or related
terms (e.g., mitm). Moreover, we do query the Google search
engine for media reports on attacks. Next, we classify the
attacks according to STRIDE categories, followed by some
examples. Attacks are considered and analyzed with respect
to probability, consequence and risk within their respective
category. Out of a total of 52 published attacks, we have
identified 37 high and critical risk attacks which are further
considered in this work.
1) Spoofing Attacks - Authenticity, Freshness [5], [21]–[38].
The goal of the attacker is to intercept, hijack, manipulate
or replay the communication with a potential remote ac-
cess persistence. Security flaws in mobile software, such as
demonstrated in the OwnStar attack [5]. OwnStar intercepts
communication after the OnStar user opens the application,
whereas the OwnStar device gains the user’s credentials. Relay
attacks, as in compromise of remote keyless entry systems
as well as breaking poor authentication mechanisms [21]–
[23]. GNSS spoofing considers broadcasting fake signals over
authentic in order to to trick a receiver, with the intention
to get a vehicle off course [24]. In-vehicle protocol spoofing,
can affect safety critical actuators, such as brake, steering
and engine control. Protocols themselves might lack inherent
mechanisms for security which makes active attacks possible
such as malicious drop, modify, spoof, flood and replay of
messages.
2) Tampering Attacks - Integrity [2], [4], [36], [38]–[41].
Vulnerable USB/OBD-II dongles or compromised in-vehicle
devices can potentially enable a hacker to control the commu-
nication. Devices can be compromised in various ways e.g.,
vulnerabilities in proprietary authentication mechanisms can
enable the right to run sensitive diagnostics commands. Brute-
force attacks can be used to retrieve cryptographic keys, with
1https://www.scopus.com/
potential to upload exploits to ECUs. Physical tampering of
ECUs or other connected devices. Manipulated firmware in
current ECUs, such as malicious code injection via firmware
update. Replacement of ECUs or new devices to eaves-
drop/inject messages or to manipulate software, modify or
compromise vehicle functions. Vulnerable connected devices
such as OBD and USB dongles can potentially provide remote
access to individual cars and vehicle fleets [40]. Moreover,
in [2] firmware was extracted and reverse engineered, ma-
nipulated and injected directly into ECU firmware facilitating
persistent and bridging capabilities for attacks.
3) Repudiation Attacks - Non-repudiation, Freshness. An
attacker manipulates or removes forensic in-vehicle data, such
as GPS coordinates, speed, acceleration and brake patterns,
with the intention to hide traces of the attack. Despite our best
effort, we did not find attacks which can be clearly mapped
to this category; however, this type of attacks will likely be
more frequent in the future due to both increased number of
attacks and digital forensic investigations.
4) Information Disclosure Attacks - Confidentiality, Privacy
[7], [38], [39], [42]–[45]. An attacker may be able to exploit
cryptographic keys and consequently decrypt sensitive data by
e.g., reverse engineering software with hard-coded keys. Bad
routines for handling of replaced unit led to leaked sensitive
data such as owners home and work address, calendar and
call entries and Wi-Fi passwords [42]. A mobile application
for vehicle control contained hard-coded credentials, thus an
attacker may be able to retrieve sensitive data remotely by
recovering the key from the application [7]. A vulnerability
in an OBD-II dongle exposed all transferred data to the
public [43]. Vulnerabilities in automotive bus technologies
make various attacks possible, such as sniffing of CAN traffic
due to its broadcast transmission and lack of encryption [44].
5) Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks - Availability [34]–[37],
[46]–[49]. Many attacks focus on the in-vehicle network that
uses CAN as this technology suffers from fundamental vul-
nerabilities with respect to security (e.g., broadcast communi-
cation, lack of encryption/authentication). Other attacks range
from sending an indefinite amount of data to ECUs to make
them unresponsive or crash, exploiting error handling mecha-
nisms, or flooding the network with high priority messages
in order to block lower priority messages. A vulnerability
in the Bluetooth functionality supported unrestricted pairing
without a PIN, thus enabled the potential for sending remote
CAN commands affecting safety critical assets [48]. The Bus-
off attack made ECUs unresponsive or crash [49]. Murvay et
al. [47] managed to disable FlexRay nodes by exploitation of
the bus guardian, power saving functionality and by causing
loss of synchronization.
6) Elevation of Privilege Attacks - Authorization [3], [7],
[36], [38], [39], [41], [50]–[52]. In [36] two Bluetooth vulner-
abilities allowed remote code execution with root privileges.
Moreover, manipulation of the firmware of the infotainment
unit enabled injection of arbitrary CAN messages. In [50], they
were able to release the airbag by message injection due to a
vulnerable authentication mechanism. Lack of authentication
in the NissanConnect app allowed to retrieve personal data by
entering an URL with the vehicle identification number [52].
The outcome of this phase is applied to Table I and used in
the next phase in the following section.
VI. RESILIENT SHIELD
In this section we present the Resilient Shield which consists
of high-level security goals emphasizing the overall design
requirements resulting from an analysis of the threat model
(Section IV). We further provide in Section VI-B detailed di-
rectives for fulfilling the high-level security goals for resilient
vehicles which are based on these goals and the attack model
(Section V). Table I summarizes the Resilient Shield. We
list automotive assets, associate them with high risk attacks,
potential threat actors and STRIDE threat categories, and link
these to suitable security and resilience techniques to show
how Resilient Shield can be used to mitigate these attacks.
A. High-level Security Goals (SGs)
The following high-level goals are the result of an analysis
of the threat model detailed in Section IV. Each SG is
associated with the relevant safety and security attributes they
enforce.
SG.1 Secure Communication. Integrity, authenticity and, in
specific cases, confidentiality need to be ensured for commu-
nication. Integrity and authenticity allow to verify the origin
of the message and protect the message from being altered
during transmission. Confidentiality can be achieved through
encryption of the message to prevent unauthorized read access.
Freshness, e.g., via counters or timestamps, can be used to
mitigate replay attacks.
SG.2 Readiness. Availability to authorized entities under
normal circumstances as well as disturbances. Even if an
adversary tries to disrupt the information flow, the integrity
and availability of correct information needs to be guaranteed.
SG.3 Separation of Duties is needed to limit access to
resources for authorized entities only. Authorization should
be combined with the principle of least privilege to limit the
number of entities having access to a resource to the minimum.
SG.4 Secure Software Techniques need to provide security
features to ensure that the executed software has not been
modified by an unauthorized entity (authenticity) and that the
software does not contain disclosed vulnerabilities.
SG.5 Separation/Segmentation on an architectural or process
level is necessary in order to limit access and reduce the sever-
ity in case of an intrusion (availability). Isolation techniques,
e.g., process isolation, should be considered where possible.
SG.6 Attack Detection and Mitigation is of utmost impor-
tance to enable the system to react and ideally prevent further
damage to the system.
SG.7 State Awareness should be ensured with the ability
to switch between various operational states, thus providing
reliability and maintainability.
SG.8 Forensics is necessary for post analysis of detected
malicious events and accordingly updating access control
policies and other preventive measures.
Physical security, such as vehicle locks, alarm system, and
protecting infrastructure server rooms should be considered.
Components must be extensively tested against requirements
separately and when integrated into the vehicle, such as stated
in the SPMT Test Phase. SPMT suggests to use both a
qualitative and quantitative assessment; however, we focus on
the qualitative assessment as the aim of Resilient Shield is to
guide the resilient design of automotive systems. Moreover,
a reduction analysis of attack trees is suggested to find com-
monalities in countermeasures; however this is not considered
and is thus left as future work.
B. Detailed Directives
In this section, we list detailed techniques and patterns that
contribute to the security and resilience of automotive systems
based on the identified security goals, threat and attack model
presented in this paper. First, we incorporate the identified
patterns from the REMIND framework [18] in Resilient Shield
and further extend them with security techniques to provide
a comprehensive collection of both, security and resilience
techniques for automotive systems. Second, we further discuss
the security aspects of the identified resilience techniques.
Next, we detail these techniques.
Authentication: Message authentication can be achieved
through Message Authentication Codes (MACs) or signatures
which ensure that the message: (i) is created by the claimed
source and (ii) has not been altered during transmission. The
authentication of devices can verify that the hardware, e.g.,
the head unit or a diagnostic device, is legit.
Encryption: Encryption of data ensures the protection of in-
tellectual property, makes it more difficult to reverse engineer
software, protects cryptographic material and the privacy of
users and forensics data.
Redundancy/Diversity: A voting mechanism is used when
comparing the output of two or more redundant systems
or software functions. Redundancy increases the resilience
against anomalies; however, from a security perspective it must
be ensured that the voting process cannot be exploited by an
attacker to perform DoS or spoofing attacks.
Access Control: Gateways with firewall capabilities allow
filtering of messages between different networks in the vehicle.
In addition, host-based firewalls on the ECUs can limit the
exposure of open communication ports. Securing physical de-
bug ports is vital to protect against unauthorized exploitation.
Access control to resources such as files, computation, and
diagnostic commands can be provided by the operating system
or by e.g., challenge-response authentication.
Runtime Enforcement: Runtime verification is combined
with reactive measures when safety properties are vio-
lated [18], [53].
Secure Storage: Cryptographic material needs to be protected
against unauthorized modifications and read access. Data can
be either stored encrypted in the regular file system or in a
protected memory partition.
Secure Boot: A validation of the authenticity and integrity of
the firmware to be loaded during the boot process [54].
Secure Programming: Secure programming guidelines such
as MISRA C [55] are important to avoid common program-
ming errors. Additionally, trusted execution environments may
be necessary for isolating and securing applications.
Secure Software Update: The ability to update software is
not only a necessity to improve and extend functionality, it is
also essential for security, e.g., to mitigate vulnerabilities. In
addition, the update process itself needs to be secure [56],
during the distribution and installation process.
Verification & Validation: The Test Phase in SPMT focuses
on the need for security testing and verification of each
asset by doing fuzz, vulnerability and penetration testing. In
addition to security testing, the verification and validation of
functionality and safety is required [10], [18].
Separation: Architectural separation can be achieved through
physical separation into smaller networks or through virtual-
ization techniques allowing to allocate resources to specific
functions or systems.
Specification-based Detection: Knowledge about abnormal
behavior is used to detect anomalies and attempts to exploit
known vulnerabilities. It also requires domain knowledge and
needs to be updated regularly [18], [57].
Anomaly-based Detection: Is based on defining normal be-
havior and deviations trigger alerts and has the potential to
detect unknown attacks. Anomaly-based detection can be cat-
egorized in statistical, information-theoretic, machine learning
and localization techniques [18], [57].
Prediction of Faults/Attacks: Predicting the next step or the
ultimate goal of an ongoing attack.
Adaptive Response: The function response may be temporar-
ily adapted, e.g., through a model, while under attack [18].
Reconfiguration: Graceful degradation can be used to limit
the impact of an attack when preventive measures failed.
Migration: The ability to migrate services to other nodes in
order to maintain system functions when under attack [18].
Checkpoint & Rollback: Used to recover the system to a
desired state. The state needs to be secured, e.g., through
secure logging, to defend against possible attacks that aim
at modifying a saved system state [18].
Rollforward Actions: Upon detecting an anomaly or error
the system transitions back to the state immediately before the
event happened. Similarly to rollback it needs to be ensured
that this mechanism cannot be exploited [18].
Self-X: The system needs to be aware of its state and able to
switch to other states when anomalies occur [18], [58].
Robustness: Employed mechanisms and functions need to be
robust against anomalies [18].
Forensics: Secure logging is used to record events, e.g.,
detection of an ongoing attack, use of specific services or
diagnostics. In addition, events with non-repudiation claims
can be used as evidence of a crime.
Table I presents the Resilient Shield. Assets with high or
critical risk threats are associated with appropriate security
and resilience techniques demonstrating the ability of Re-
silient Shield to defend against these threats. For example,
TABLE I
RESILIENT SHIELD. A MAPPING FROM AUTOMOTIVE ASSETS TO IDENTIFIED ATTACKS, POTENTIAL THREAT ACTORS, STRIDE THREAT CATEGORIES
AND ULTIMATELY TO APPROPRIATE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE TECHNIQUES, AND SECURITY GOALS (SGS).







































































































































































































































































































































sensor:camera [34], [35] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • •
sensor:GNSS [24], [26], [29], [30], [32] FC, CT, HA S • • • • • • •
sensor:lidar [28], [34] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • •
sensor:ultrasonic [35] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • •
Communication
internal:can [40], [44], [46], [47], [49] FA, FC, CT, IN, HA S, T, I, D • • • • • • • • • • • • •
internal:flexray [37] FA, FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • • • • • •
external:bluetooth [4], [36] FC, CT, HA S, T, D, E • • •
external:usb [4] FC, CT, HA S, T, E • • •
external:keyfob [22], [23] HA, SK S • • • •
external:wifi [5], [33] HA, SK S, I • • • • •
external:cellular [3], [4], [41], [45],
[51], [52]
FC, CT, HA, SK S, T, I, D, E • • •
external:obdII [7], [27], [31], [38], [40],
[43], [46], [48]
CT, HA S, T, I, D, E • • • • • • • • • •
external:debugport [3], [41] HA, IN I, E • •
Software
running:state [25] FC, CT, HA S, D • • • • • • •
running:firmware [3]–[5], [33], [36],
[39], [41], [45], [51], [52]
FC, CT, HA S, T, E • • • • • • • • • •
instorage:update [4], [36], [41] HA, SK S, T, E • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
instorage:weakcrypto [21], [50], [52] FC, CT, HA, SK S, E • • •
Data Storage
crypto:certificates [41] FC, CT, HA I • • • •
hw:replaced [42] HA, SK I • • •
hacktivists and insiders are the main threat actors for com-
munication:external:debugport, such as JTAG, and needs to
be protected with authentication mechanisms combined with
access control or, if not possible otherwise, with physical
protection (e.g., deactivation).
VII. CONCLUSION
We have performed a comprehensive threat and risk analysis
of published attacks against vehicles and derived imperative
security and resilience mechanisms by applying the SPMT
methodology. A threat model with vital vehicle assets and
related potential threat actors, their motivations and objec-
tives was developed. By an extensive analysis of threats
and attacks, further filtered and categorized based on attack
type, probability and consequence criteria, an attack model
was developed based on the remaining high risk attacks.
Based on the developed models, a comprehensive mapping
between asset, attack, threat actor, threat category, and defense
mechanisms was performed for all attacks and is presented in
Table I. Table I summarizes the outcomes by applying SPMT,
i.e. the Resilient Shield, a novel framework both justifying and
defining imperative security and resilient mechanisms needed
in a modern vehicle. Consequently, the Resilient Shield can be
used as a vital baseline for protection against common security
threats and attacks.
We believe our work is imperative for facilitating and guiding
the design of resilient automotive systems; however, it still
remains to be seen how large the coverage is in relation to
future attacks. Moreover, testing and validation of the Resilient
Shield within an industrial context is left as a future work.
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